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Investing in Financially Distressed Companies





This study evaluates the specific characteristics attributed to companies that enter
Chapter 11 and emerge with their stock intact. While we find no statistically significant
characteristics that uniquely identify such firms, the results suggest that a company that is
more financially sound is more likely to retain its shareholders. Specifically, firms that
emerge from Chapter 11 with their stock intact tend to have a higher return on assets and
lower debt ratios.
Literature Review
A company has many choices when filing for bankruptcy. "The Bankruptcy Code
defines five types of bankruptcies: Chapter 7 (liquidation), Chapter 9 (municipalities),
Chapter 11 (reorganization), Chapter 12 (family farmer reorganizations), and Chapter 13
(consumer and small business reorganizations)" (Griffing 1997). The most common
provision used for companies is Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Under Chapter 11, a company
can remain in operation while it creates a plan of reorganization (Neish 1995). While in
Chapter 11, "a firm is protected from its creditors in that they may not call their loans or
claim assets offered as security" (Neish 1995).
A change in the Bankruptcy Code occurred in 1999 with the LaSalle Decision.
This decision made changes to the New Value Exception, which is a common law
exception to the Absolute Priority Rule. Previously, claims to the assets of a company
followed a specific order. Creditors were the first entity to receive payment from the
distressed company and then equity holders would receive payment if unclaimed assets
were still available. In these two classes, there are many stratified groups of creditors and
equity holders. With the New Value Exception, there is the possibility for shareholders
to infuse capital into the company to retain a claim on the company. Although this is a
possibility, the New Value Exception has to be approved by the creditors and the
bankruptcy court before it is accepted. Moreover, shareholders have to follow specific
procedures to infuse capital. Shareholders are required to infuse capital at the market
price so shareholders go through a bid process, an auction, or competing plans to infuse
capital. Finally, the use of the New Value Exception could change the process by
allowing shareholders to retain a stake in the company in bankruptcy (Mendoza 2000).
A company may enter into Chapter 11 to exploit specific advantages. The
advantage to entering Chapter 11 is that it allows the company to operate at lower cost
than other solvent companies. This is possible because companies in Chapter 11 do not
have to pay their creditors. Therefore, companies are able to use debt without incurring
any cost of debt. For example, if an airline declares Chapter 11, it is able to reduce its
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costs and therefore, reduce the costs to its customers. This action could stimulate demand
for the company and increase profits. Subsequently, this has the potential to allow the
company to recover and enter competitively into the market (Neish 1995). However, in
industries such as the airline industry, which is very prone to Chapter 11, this action
could force competitors to reduce price resulting in the competitors filing for Chapter 11.
Another advantage to filing bankruptcy is that it could resolve a company's tax problems.
Through sound planning, bankruptcy can provide a "very attractive form of financing for
a tax-troubled company" (Griffing 1997). For example, if a company has equipment on
its books for $100,000 and sells it for $200,000, there is a $100,000 gain on the sale.
However, the equipment has outstanding debt of $250,000. Therefore, if the company
completes this transaction in Chapter 11, the gain on the sale is not recognized as revenue
and is not taxed as such. The tax liability is thus reduced (Griffing 1997).
At the same time, creditors see disadvantages from a firm entering into Chapter
11. The first disadvantage is that the managers of the company retain their positions
when the company enters bankruptcy since no trustee is appointed to take control.
Therefore, the managers who led the company to bankruptcy are charged with bringing
the company out of bankruptcy. Also, the company has a four-month period to file a plan
of reorganization. This four-month period enables the company to continue operating in
a non-profitable manner for four months. Subsequently, this time period can cause the
company to become more distressed. Creditors then may have less of a claim to assets or
creditors may have to wait longer to receive the claims (Dowling 1993).
Previous studies examine the effect bankruptcy has on a firm's returns and
possible reasons firms enter into bankruptcy. In one study (Eberhart 1999), returns of
companies who emerged from bankruptcy were examined for 200 days after emergence.
This study revealed "weak evidence of positive excess returns in the short-term and
strong evidence of positive excess returns in the long-term." Another article that
discusses the abnormal positive returns of Chapter 11 companies is "Gold out of
Garbage" by Brian O'Keefe. This article discusses the strategy of distressed securities
fund managers. This article coupled with the Eberhart study advocates the process of
investing in financially distressed companies because if the company emerges from
Chapter 11, there is a higher probability for abnormal returns.
Hotchkiss (1999) provides evidence that is contrary to the previous studies.
Hotchkiss finds that a large number of the emerging firms are not able to remain
successful. Within two years of emergence, many firms had entered back into
bankruptcy or had ceased to exist as companies. Therefore, the abnormal returns cannot
be achieved in many cases because the companies never emerge from Chapter 11.
Hill (1996) performed an event study with a stated purpose "to examine
accounting information's role in identifying firm bankruptcy and financial distress." Two
main accounting ratios examined were the profitability and leverage ratios of the firm.
The results showed that a firm that had either high profitability or low leverage was less
likely to enter into bankruptcy.
Purpose of the Study
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Distressed finns are companies who are experiencing financial distress or are in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We concentrate on finns that have filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.
When a company enters Chapter 11, it is protected from its debts while it
reorganizes to become profitable. The tennination of the company stock is a usual
occurrence in Chapter 11 reorganization, in which case the stock becomes worthless.
However, in recent years, there have been more companies that have kept the stock intact
throughout the process. To be considered intact, the original shareholders must retain
their stock after the finn emerges from bankruptcy. A company that cancels its shares
and issues new shares or gives the outstanding shares to the debt holders would not be
considered intact. In 1999, the New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule was
enacted which makes it more probable that a stock will stay intact.
We examine the financial characteristics of distressed companies around their
bankruptcy filing. Specifically, financial ratios are examined for several months before
and after a finn files for Chapter 11.
The main goal of the study is to identify the characteristics that distinguish those
companies that emerge from bankruptcy with their stock intact from those that have their
stock cancelled. Our sample of finns is separated into two distinct groups. In one group,
there are companies who have cancelled their outstanding shares. In the other group,
there are the companies, which emerged from Chapter 11 with their stock intact. We
analyze both samples to find characteristics that differentiate the finns in the two groups.
Usually, a company that emerges from Chapter 11 with their stock intact experiences
abnonnal positive returns; therefore, it is important to distinguish these characteristics so
an investor can make better investment decisions regarding distressed finns.
This topic is important because of the recent prevalence of bankruptcies. Since
there is a scarce amount of empirical research in this area, this study could provide
guidance and knowledge that is useful to investors.
Sample and Methodology
The sample was constructed using SEC filings for companies that filed for
Chapter 11 in the time period 1997-2005. A list of companies was obtained containing
all companies who filed for Chapter 11 during this period. We created a program to
search the Edgar Database for the S-4 filings of the Chapter 11 companies. The program
searched the database for S-4's that had either of the words "cancelled" or
"reorganization". If a Chapter 11 company had a corresponding S-4 with either of those
words in the document, the S-4 was sent to a text file and saved for future use. After all
the S-4's were collected, a text file of Chapter 11 companies was compared to a text file
ofS-4's.
The sample was constructed by searching for Chapter 11 companies, which had
S-4's, which explained the status of its outstanding stock. When comparing the two text
files, some Chapter 11 companies did not have any corresponding S-4' s, so the
companies were eliminated from the study. Some companies had S-4's, but the S-4's did
not correspond to the correct time period for the bankruptcy, so those companies were
eliminated. The companies that remained in the study had S-4's which clearly stated the
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status of the original shares of the company. Through this meticulous process, we were
able to identify 18 companies.
Using the CRSP database, we retrieved data on the 18 companies. The
characteristics were cash, working capital, long-term debt, sales, interest expense, taxes,
net income, retained earnings, and cash flow from operations. Only 13 of the 18
companies returned data. The other five companies had to be excluded from the data
analysis part of the study; however, those companies were included in the qualitative
analysis.
The remaining 13 companies were split into two groups. The first group included
five companies that filed for Chapter 11 and emerged from bankruptcy with the original
shareholders. The specific ways in which each company retained the original
shareholders can be seen in Table 1. Some companies did not change the shareholders
position, while other companies issued warrants or a percentage of the newly created
shares to the original shareholders. The second group included eight companies that filed
for Chapter 11 and emerged from bankruptcy with their shares cancelled.
We analyzed the data to find characteristics that differentiated the groups. We
analyzed financial data, one and two years before bankruptcy for both groups. The
DuPont Equation, Altman's Z-score, Debt-to-Equity Ratio, and Total Asset Turnover
Ratio were calculated for each group. The ratios were calculated for one year before
bankruptcy, two years before bankruptcy, and a five-year average. A variance and




Since the sample size was small, the t-statistic was used. The list of ratios that used 13
companies is the DuPont Equation and the Altman Z-score. The Debt-to-Equity Ratio
and Total Asset Turnover excluded Amerco and Koll Real Estate. The appropriate
significant z-scores for a p-Ievel of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 for 13 companies are: 3.0123,
2.1604, and 1.7709, respectively. The appropriate significant z-scores for a p-Ievel of
0.01,0.05, and 0.10 for 11 companies are: 3.1058,2.201, and 1.7959, respectively.
Results
The results show that there is a significant difference in some of the measures. In
particular, there is one ratio that is significant at the 10% level one year before
bankruptcy. There is one ratio significant at the 10% level and one ratio significant at the
5% level two years before bankruptcy.
Since the sample size is small, it is very difficult to find many significant ratios.
However, even if the data is not statistically significant, there are overall trends in the
financial measures, which lead to a logical economic conclusion about the different
characteristics between the two groups.
In the analysis of the ROE, Altman Z-score, Debt ratio, and Total Asset Turnover,
there are no statistically significant ratios. The ratios do follow a trend, which suggests
possible distinguishable differences between the two groups.
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In the qualitative analysis, there were not any obvious differences between the
companIes.
Financial Characteristics of Intact and Cancelled Firms
The financial characteristics portion of the analysis is the only portion, which
revealed statistically significant differences between the two groups. This data is
displayed in Table 2 and Table 3. More data was statistically significant two years before
bankruptcy than one year before bankruptcy.
One year before bankruptcy, the sales were statistically significantly different
between the two groups. Sales had a t-statistic of -2.030, which is shaded in Table 2.
This measure describes the scale of the companies. Intact companies are much smaller
than Cancelled companies. Therefore, it would appear size is a significant factor in
determining if the shares will remain intact.
The other ratios were not statistically significant, but had notable economic
significance. The Intact companies had a lower long-term debt to assets and a higher
cash flow from operations to sales. This pattern suggests that the Intact companies were
more economically sound one year before bankruptcy. The lower level of long-term debt
for Intact is reflected in the interest expense to sales. The interest expense to sales for
Cancelled firms, 0.184, was four times the amount of Intact firm's 0.044 interest expense
to sales. This data suggests that companies fewer debt obligations were more likely able
to keep their stock intact.
Profitability tends to be higher for Intact firms as evidenced by two statistically
significant ratios. CFO to sales is significant at the 10% level and earnings per share
(EPS) is significant at the 5% level two years before bankruptcy. EPS for Intact firms
and Cancelled firms is 1.235 and -1.240, respectively. The variance is four times higher
for Cancelled firms. The trend in ratios from one year before bankruptcy is seen in the
data two years before bankruptcy. Intact firms have a higher EPS, which it is retaining,
at a higher level. The CFO to sales is significant since net income is a major driver of
CFO. Since net income to shares is significant, CFO is likely to be significant. Since the
levels of earnings are much higher for Intact firms, the levels of debt and interest
payments are not as burdensome. The reason that the ratios of interest payments to sales
and debt ratio become statistically significant one year before bankruptcy seems to be
attributed to the lower levels of net income and cash flow from operations two years
before bankruptcy.
After comparing the two years of financial data, Intact companies seem to have
had better revenues and lower interest expense. Since the Intact companies have less
debt to service, the companies have fewer or not as powerful creditors in Chapter 11.
This difference can be a reason to differentiate between whether a company kept its stock
intact.
Individual Ratios - DuPont Equation .
In the DuPont Equation analysis, which is depicted in Table 5, no data is
statistically significant. However, one and two years before bankruptcy, Intact firms
have a much higher ROE. One year before bankruptcy, Intact firm's ROE is 0.8335
compared to Group Two's 0.4893. Two years before bankruptcy, Intact firm's ROE is
0.0727 compared to Cancelled firm's -0.0134. In the five-year averages, which is an
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average of all the companies five year averages; the ROE for Intact firms is slightly
smaller than Cancelled firms. The five-year averages can be a misleading number since
it is an average of averages. In any case, the trend of healthier numbers continues in that
Intact firms have higher ROE for most of the years. This would lead to the conclusion
that the Intact companies were better off financially than the Cancelled companies.
Individual Ratios - Altman Z-score
In the Altman Z-score analysis, which is depicted in Table 6, no data is
statistically significant. Once again, a trend forms between the two groups numbers.
Companies with a higher Altman Z-score are considered to be more financially healthy
and have a lower probability of entering into bankruptcy within two years. Intact
companies' Altman Z-score's were approximately double that of Cancelled firm's
Altman Z-scores, however they were not significantly different. This suggests that Intact
companies, have a sounder financial situation than that of Cancelled companies. This
could be one of the reasons that the Intact companies could keep their shares intact.
Individual Ratios - Debt to Equity
In the Debt-to-Equity analysis, which is depicted in Table 7, no data is
statistically significant. The data in this section follows the same pattern as the ROE. A
lower debt-to-equity equation would be better for these companies since the companies
were very close to bankruptcy. One and two years before bankruptcy, Intact firms have a
lower debt ratio. In the five-year average, Intact firm's debt ratio was almost nine times
the debt ratio of Cancelled firms. However, the variance on any of these ratios was very
high. Overall, Intact firms have a lower debt ratio, which would allow that group to
handle a reduction in revenue better than the Cancelled firms. The higher debt ratio
would create a higher proportion of debt holders, which become part of the Chapter 11
process. With a higher proportion of debt holders seeking claims to the business, there
would be less of a chance that the equity holders would be allowed to retain claim to any
part of the company.
Individual Ratios - Total Asset Turnover
In the Total Asset Turnover analysis, which is depicted in Table 8, no data is
statistically significant. This analysis reveals that there is really is no difference in total
asset turnover ratios between the groups. Thus, it appears total asset turnover did not
affect or provide insight into whether or not the company would keep its stock intact.
Qualitative Analysis
The companies that were part of this study came from many industries and had
many different reasons for bankruptcy. This qualitative data is organized in Table 9.
Since the companies came from many industries, no particular industry can be named as
an industry, which has a higher likelihood of retaining shareholders.
By separating the companies by the reasons for bankruptcy, six distinct reasons
were found. Poor performance and large expansion with debt were the most popular
reasons. These reasons could actually be considered one reason in some respects. The
companies that had a large expansion with debt would not have gone into bankruptcy
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without poor perfonnance, which then led to bankruptcy. However, Intact finns and
Cancelled finns were spread across all reasons.
One area that might be useful in differentiating Intact finns from Cancelled finns
is the bankruptcy filings applied to partial bankruptcies. Amerco and Rymer Foods are
companies that filed partial bankruptcies. Amerco did not file Chapter 11 for the V-Haul
part of its business and Rymer Foods did not file Chapter 11 for its Rymer Meats
subsidiary. A more detailed explanation of each company's bankruptcy can be found in
Table 10.
Conclusion
This study examines characteristics of companies that enter into Chapter 11 and
emerge with their shares intact relative to companies that cancel their shares. There are
no statistically significant characteristics that uniquely identify finns that emerge with
their shares intact.
The results show that companies that are more economically sound have a better
probability of retaining the original shareholders. Companies with higher EPS and a
lower debt ratio are characteristics that can be examined to detennine the chance that a
company will retain shareholders.
The trends in all the individual ratios echo the same principles. Companies that
are more solvent and have a better ROE will have a higher probability of retaining shares.
Since this study was quite small, some of the ratios could be misleading.
Therefore, a more detailed study, which includes at least thirty companies in each group,
would lead to more conclusive results.
For future research, a concentration on partial bankruptcies could lead to more
interesting results. Both partial bankruptcies in this study were included in Group One.
If more partial bankruptcies could be found, they could be classified to see if that is a
significant characteristic for retaining the original shares.
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Financial Characteristics of Intact and Cancelled Firms One Year Before Bankruptcy
Intact Firms Cancelled Firms
Mean Variance Mean Varinance Difference t-statistic
Cash to Assets 0.020 0.000 0.028 0.000 -0.008 -0.764
Long-Term Debt to
Assests 0.362 0.047 0.632 0.154 -0.270 -1.601
Working Capital to
Assets -0.077 0.025 -0.039 0.025 -0.038 -0.427
Sales 657.518 456386.735 1693.521 1353226.767 -1036.003
Interest Expense to
Sales 0.044 0.000 0.184 0.053 -0.140 -1.720
Income Taxes to Sales 0.013 0.002 -0.134 0.136 0.147 1.113
Profit Margin -0.024 0.014 -0.841 2.244 0.817 1.535
Earnings Per Share -0.437 4.462 -2.475 25.487 2.037 1.009
Retained Earnings to
Sales 0.015 0.099 -1 .935 11.173 1.950 1.638




*** p-value of 0.1
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Table 3
Financial Characteristics of Intact and Cancelled Firms Two Years Before Bankruptcy
Intact Firms Cancelled Firms
Mean Variance Mean Varinance Difference t-statistic
Cash to Assets 0.052 0.004 0.028 0.002 0.024 0.763
Long-Term Debt to
Assests 0.387 0.011 0.491 0.139 -0.104 -0.743
Working Capital to
Assets 0.053 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.036 0.523
Sales 605.706 406524.294 3094.726 18455871.247 -2489.019 -1.611
Interest Expense to
Sales 0.053 0.001 0.198 0.101 -0.146 -1.284
Income Taxes to Sales 0.019 0.000 -0.058 0.029 0.077 1.266
Profit Margin 0.023 0.001 -0.307 0.318 0.330 1.651
Earnings Per Share 1.235 1.400 -1 .240 7.779 2.475
Retained Earnings to
Sales 0.051 0.072 -1.240 4.292 1.292 1.740






































































































This table reports DuPont Equations for the two groups. The DuPont Equation was calculated by
using the formula recommended by the CFA Institute. All 13 of the companies' data is
represented. Harvard Industries and Hvide Marine had unknown data for five years before
bankruptcy and four years before bankruptcy, respectively. Those years were excluded. The
mean, median, variance, difference of means, and standard error were calculated for each
group. Panels A, B, and C separate the parameters by the time period in which the numbers
were derived.






Panel B: DuPont E uation Two Years Before Bankru tc







Panel C: DuPont E uation with Five Year Avera es Before Bankruptc
















This table reports Altman Z-score for the two groups. The Altman Z-score was calculated by using the
modified version of Altman's (1968) Z-score. All 13 of the companies' data is represented. Harvard
Industries and Hvide Marine had unknown data for five years before bankruptcy and four years before
bankruptcy, respectively. The mean, median, variance, difference of means, and standard error were
calculated for each group. Panels A, B, and C separate the parameters by the time period in which the
numbers were derived.






Panel B: Altman Z-score Two Years Before Bankru tc






Panel C: Altman Z-score with Five Year Avera es Before Bankru tc






Panel A: Debt to E uit One Year Before Bankru tc







This table reports Debt to Equity Equation for the two groups. The Debt to Equity was calculated by using
the standard equation from the CFA Institute. Amerco and Koll Real Estate were excluded because both
companies had unknown values for current liabilities. Harvard Industries and Hvide Marine had unknown
data for five years before bankruptcy and four years before bankruptcy, respectively. The mean, median,
variance, difference of means, and standard error were calculated for each group. Panels A, B, and C
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Panel C: Debt to E uit with Five Year Avera es Before Bankru tc













This table reports Total Asset Turnover Equation for the two groups. The Total Asset Turnover was
calculated by using the standard equation from the CFA Institute. Amerco and Koll Real Estate were
excluded because both companies had unknown values for current liabilities. Harvard Industries and
Hvide Marine had unknown data for five years before bankruptcy and four years before bankruptcy,
respectively. The mean, median, variance, difference of means, and standard error were calculated for
each group. Panels A, B, and C separate the parameters by the time period in which the numbers were
derived.






Panel B: Total Asset Turnover Two Years Before Bankru tc






Panel C: Total Asset Turnover with Five Year Avera es Before Bankruptc

















































































































































































Summary of Chapter 11 Sample Companies
Harvard Industries
A producer of automotive parts and accessories. It sold three poorly performing
subsidiaries in Chapter 11. The Chapter 11 filing was the result of continued losses by its
Doehler-Jarvis subsidiary, which makes aluminum castings.
Amerco
Amerco, which also owns Amerco Real Estate and two insurance units, sought
bankruptcy protection in June after failing to obtain refinancing for $866 million of debt.
The U-Haul portion ofthe company was not involved in the bankruptcy. When it filed
the plan of reorganization, Amerco stated it would repay the $1.38 billion it owed to
creditors.
Carmike Cinemas
Carmike had been acquiring theatres and building new theatres at a rapid pace. Its goal
was to position itself as the dominant movie chain in communities with populations of
less than 500,000. Problems for the company came to the forefront when senior creditors
blocked the $9 million in interest payments to bondholders on August 1,2000. Carmike
subsequently filed for Chapter 11 to reorganize the company.
Hvide Marine Inc.
Hvide operates 275 vessels all around the world primarily in the oil field serving
business. Hvide sold $300 million in Senior Notes in February 1998. Hvide was unable to
secure other types of financing to service its semi-annual coupon payment in February
1999. It filed for filed for bankruptcy in August 1999 to implement a plan negotiated
with its bondholders.
Rymer Foods
Rymer Foods, through its subsidiary, Rymer Meat Inc., is primarily engaged in the
development and production of frozen, pre-seasoned, portion controlled meat entrees.
The company also produces products for restaurants and other foodservices. The
company entered into Chapter 11 to complete balance sheet restructuring. Rymer Meat
Inc. was not part of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Chiquita Brands
Chiquita Brands entered into Chapter 11 because it could not pay its debt. This was a
result of suffering losses of more than $1.5 billion over eight years during a dispute with
the European Union over banana imports. European quotas on bananas grown in Latin
America cost the companyan estimated $200million a year.
Zenith Electronics Corp
Zenith was involved in cable television technology and was a producer of electronics.
After many years in the business, Zenith started to come into hard times. In the early
19
1990's, Zenith became a hostile takeover target. Zenith decided to make a deal with LG
Electronics to give LG a five percent stake in Zenith. As the years passed, the stake was
increased to 55%. After Zenith filed for bankruptcy, LG bought all of the firm's stock
and assumed all the debt to release Zenith from Chapter 11.
Joy Global, formerly Harnischfeger Industries, Inc.
The company's problems began when there was a failed hostile takeover attempt by the
Giddings and Lewis Corp. That situation diverted management's attention from the
downturn in Asia's economy. Subsequently, the company began to have severe working
capital problems. Finally, the company booked $1 billion worth of orders in Asia, but
worsening Asian economies caused the Asian company to withhold $300 million in
payment. The company had to enter Chapter 11 to restructure. The foreign subsidiaries
were not included in the bankruptcy.
Koll Real Estate Group, currently California Coastal Communities
Koll Real Estate's parent company was involved with Dresser Industries in 1988.
Dresser acquired an engineering and construction business from Koll Real Estate's parent
company. Dresser filed litigation against Koll Real Estate related to the acquisition since
asbestos claims were made against buildings affiliated with the parent company. The
litigation eventually forced Koll Real Estate Group to file for Chapter 11.
Genesis Health Ventures
Genesis Health Ventures managed nursing homes. Genesis followed a policy of rapid
growth. Through the late 1990's, Genesis continued to acquire companies and become
involved in joint ventures. As the company's revenue declined, it was unable to meet its
interest payments and had to file for Chapter 11.
Warnaco Group
The Warnaco Group is the maker of Calvin Klein jeans. Warnaco sought Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection in June 2001, unable to pay debt from acquisitions and licensing
agreements. Warnaco renegotiated licensing deals, sold assets and closed retail stores
during its reorganization.
Hayes Lemmerz
Hayes Lemmerz problems began in February 1999, when it acquired CMI International
for a cash purchase price of approximately $605 million. During the second half 2000
and throughout 2001, Hayes Lemmerz dealt with reduced demand and operational
problems. The liquidity of the company began to be an issue. After restating previous
earnings in 2001, Hayes Lemmerz was unable to secure any new debt and needed to file
for Chapter 11.
Spectrasite
Spectrasite is one ofthe largest wireless tower operators in the United States. To become
more competitive in the tower market, Spectrasite had to use a large amount of debt to
make capital expenditures. Eventually, Spectrasite defaulted on $200 million of bonds





Over a period of 13 years, Pathmark Stores conducted a series of moves to reduce debt
such as a huge stock buyback. In December 1999, a planned acquisition by Royal Ahold,
the Dutch food retailing giant, fell through, leaving Pathmark with no time to refinance
its debt before key payments were due. Pathmark had to enter into Chapter 11.
Horizon PCS
Horizon PCS is a wireless affiliate of Sprint PCS. Due to continued drop in customers
and EBITDA, Horizon was unable to meet creditor obligations. Therefore, it searched
for a buyer, but was not able to find one soon enough. Horizon filed for Chapter 11 and
was then bought by Sprint PCS.
RCN Corp
RCN Corp entered in Chapter 11 because it could not service the $1.2 billion in debt
obligations. After a short time in Chapter 11, it was able to renegotiate the terms of the
agreements to emerge.
Mirant Corp.
Mirant was a subsidiary of Southern Company. When Mirant was a part of Southern
Company, Southern had Mirant take out a large amount of debt and help pay for the
dividends of Southern. This caused the subsidiary, Mirant, to start to have liquidity
problems. Once Mirant was spun-off, it began to have severe liquidity problems which
caused Moody's to downgrade its debt. This downgrade caused Mirant to file for
Chapter 11.
NorthWestern Corp.
NorthWestern Corporation, a Montana utility owner and energy trader had losses in five
of the past six quarters which led to filing for Chapter 11. The companyhad $1.76
billion of debt after failing to refinance or sell stock.
